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The Inconsistent.
Collateral Contract

I. Introduction
1.

The ParolEvidence Rule

The parol evidence rule provides that evidence extraneous to a
written contract cannot be received to add to, vary or contradict its
terms. Although it can be so simply stated, this rule has been the
source of a great deal of confusion in the law of contract. It was
enforced rigidly when it first became established as part of the
common law but has since been gradually relaxed. As the English
courts became faced with new situations where too strict an
adherence to the rule would have caused injustice, they created
numerous apparent exceptions to it.
The decisions of the Canadian and other Commonwealth courts
have followed a similar pattern. The rule has often been stated and
applied in wide exclusionary terms yet, in a whole host of cases,
evidence has been admitted to vary or add to, and sometimes even
to directly contradict, the terms of a writing. In most of these
instances, it was not made clear whether the evidence had been
admitted by way of exception to the rule or because its true scope
did not extend to cover them. The practice of the courts has been
singularly divergent and many of the cases are impossible to
reconcile. Part of the trouble has resulted from the fact that there has
been no leading case which has attempted to collect all the
authorities and definitively restate the scope of the rule. Nowadays,
it almost seems that when a judge wants to exclude parol evidence,
perhaps to save him the trouble of deciding between competing
witnesses, he simply appeals to one of the many broad statements of
the rule, whilst, if he wants to admit such evidence, he invokes one
of the numerous exceptions or even ignores the rule altogether.
A notable instance of the inconsistent practice of the Canadian
courts is their decisions dealing with the effect of clauses in
contractual documents purporting to limit the parties' agreement to
the terms set out therein. These "merger" or "disclaimer" clauses
are the parol evidence equivalent of exemption clauses. They may
*David W. McLauchlan, Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of
Wellington.
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be found in many standard form contracts and usually consist of a
brief statement that there are no representations, promises,
warranties or conditions other than those set out in the writing or
simply that the writing contains the whole contract between the
parties. On some occasions', the Canadian courts have refused to
allow such clauses to prevent the enforcement of what was seen to
be the real agreement between the parties. However, on others 2 ,
they have been regarded as conclusive of the intention of the parties
to exclude from their contract oral representations or promises.
2. The CollateralContract
This is perhaps the most commonly invoked "exception" to the
parol evidence rule. During the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the English courts were willing on some occasions to give effect to
oral promises by holding that there was a collateral contract. Parol
evidence was regarded as inadmissible for the purpose of adding a
term to a written document, nevertheless the courts would admit
such evidence to prove that the parties entered into a prior separate
contract, the consideration for which was the entry into the written
principal contract. Not wishing to make a frontal attack on the rule,
the courts used this device, albeit spasmodically, to cope with cases
where too strict an adherence to the rule would have caused obvious
injustice, i.e. where they were satisfied on the facts that the oral
promise had been given.
Thus, in Lindley v. Lacey, 3 the plaintiff had refused to sign a
contract for the sale of his business to the defendant until he
received the latter's promise to settle an action brought against him
by one Chase. The Court of Common Pleas held that the promise
was a separate collateral contract, the consideration for which was
1. E.g., Long v. Smith (1911), 23 O.L.R. 121 (D.C.); CaliforniaStandardCo. v.
Chiswell (1955), 14 W.W.R. 456 (Alta. S.C.); FrontierFinance Ltd. v. Hynes
(1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 206 (Ont. C.A.) Ferlandv. Keith (1959), 15 D.L.R. (2d)
472 (Ont. C.A.); Francis v. Trans Canada TrailerSales Ltd., [1969] 6 D.L.R.
(3d) 705 (Sask. C.A.); Canadian Acceptance Corpn. v. Mid-Town Motors Ltd.
(1970), 72 W.W.R. 365 (Sask. D.C.).
2. E.g., Allcock v. Manitoba Windmill and Pump Co. (1911), 18 W.L.R. 77
(Sask. S.C.); Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. Keene, [1919] 2 W.W.R. 143
(Sask. C.A.); Kaster v. Cowan, [1925] 2 W.W.R. 186 (Alta. S.C.); Empire
Milking Machine Co. v. Petherick, [1933] O.W.N. 356 (C.A.); Spelchan v. Long
(1956), 2 D.L.R. (2d) 707 (B.C.C.A); Aetna FactorsCorp. v. Breau (1957), 10
D.L.R. (2d) 100 (N.B. Cty. Ct.); Dodds v. Millman (1964), 47 W.W.R. 690

(B.C.S.C.).
3. (1864), 17 C.B. (N.S.) 578; 144E.R. 232.
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the entry into the later written contract, and could be enforced
4
against the defendant. Erle C. J. said:
I take it to be substantially the same as if, the agreement for the
sale of the goods being before them, Lacey had said to Lindley,
'In consideration of your signing that agreement, I will settle
Chase's action'.
In Morgan v. Griffith5 the plaintiff refused to sign a lease unless
the defendant promised to destroy the rabbits that were overrunning
the land. The defendant gave his undertaking that they would be
destroyed and the plaintiff then requested that a term to that effect
should be inserted in the lease. The defendant refused but repeated
his promise to destroy the rabbits, whereupon the plaintiff signed the
lease. The Court of Exchequer enforced the oral promise as a
collateral contract. This decision was followed two years later on
similar facts in Erskine v. Adeane.a
The Canadian courts soon followed suit and enforced oral
7
agreements as collateral contracts in a number of early cases.
Although contrary to its spirit, the collateral contract did not
constitute a departure from the letter of the rule. The courts'
reasoning may be summarised as follows - "The parol evidence
rule only prevents the addition of terms to a written contract. When
we find a collateral contract, we are not adding terms. Indeed, we
are accepting that the written contract contains a complete record of
its terms. A collateral contract is a separate contract altogether and
is related only in the sense that the entry into the written contract
furnishes its consideration." Despite this readily acceptable
rationalisation, the collateral contract is a "device" because,
although there must be some indication on the facts that the parties
could have intended to make two contracts rather than one, in reality
they intend one contract only. However, its utility to overcome the
parol evidence rule has never been doubted, particularly since the
House of Lords decision in Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton
where Lord Moulton summed up the law as follows: 8
It is evident, both on principle and on authority, that there may be
a contract the consideration for which is the making of some
4. (1864), 17 C.B. (N.S.) 586; 144 E.R. 235.
5. (1871), L.R. 6Ex. 70.
6. (1873), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 756.
7. E.g. Byers v. McMillan (1887) 15 S.C.R. 194 (Man.); Brownsbergerv. Harvey
(1909), 12 W.L.R. 596 (Sask. S.C.); Tocher v. Thompson (1913), 5 W.W.R. 812
(Man. C.A.).
8. [1913]A.C. 30at47(H.L.).
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other contract. "If you will make such and such a contract I will
give you one hundred pounds", is in every sense of the word a
complete legal contract. It is collateral to the main contract, but
each has an independent existence, and they do not differ in
respect of their possessing to the full the character and status of a
contract.
The device of the collateral contract has, of course, been utilised
in contexts other than the parol evidence rule. For example, where
the transaction is one which is required to be evidenced in writing
by the Statute of Frauds, the courts, by adopting a two-contract
rather than a one-contract analysis, have been able to avoid
rendering the transaction unenforceable on the ground that the
memorandum does not contain all the material terms. 9 The
collateral contract has also been utilised to enforce third party
promises 10 and as a saving device where the written contract is
illegal"1 or where to regard the 'collateral' promise as part of the
one contract would render the whole contract illegal. 12
It is not, however, the writer's intention to consider in detail in
this article the nature of the collateral contract or the situations in
which it has been used. These topics have been adequately dealt
with elsewhere.' 3 Rather it is proposed to discuss the important
limitation placed on the enforceability of a collateral contract by the
early decisions that it must not contradict the terms of the principal
written contract. It will be the writer's contention that, in principle,
this requirement is unjustified, despite the overwhelming weight of
authority to the contrary.
H.

The Requirementof Consistency

On numerous occasions, alleged collateral contracts have been
upset on the ground that they contradicted the terms of the principal
contract and, even on the occasions when a collateral contract has
been upheld, the requirement of consistency has almost always been
emphasised. The authorities include decisions of the Privy

9. Angell v. Duke (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 174; Jameson v. Kinmel Bay Land Co.
(1931), 47 T.L.R. 593 (C.A.).
10. As in Andrews v. Hopkinson [1957] 1 Q.B. 229; [1956] 3 AII.E.R. 422
11. As inStrongman(1945) Ltd. v. Sincock, [1955] 2 Q.B. 525; [1955] 3 AU.E.R.
90 (C.A.).
12. Mouat v. Betts Motors Ltd., [1959] N.Z.L.R. 15 (J.C.)
13. K. W. Wedderburn, CollateralContracts, [1959] Camb. L.J. 58.
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Council, 14 the Supreme Court of Canada 15 and other Canadian
courts, 1 6 the English Court of Appeal, 17 the High Court of
Australia, 18 and the New Zealand Supreme Court. 19
The sole authority to the contrary is City and Westminster
Properties(1934) Ltd. v. Mudd. 20 The defendant had been tenant of
the plaintiff's shop for a number of years and, during this period, he
had been allowed to sleep in a room behind the shop. In the course
of negotiations for a new lease, the defendant had managed to have
struck out a clause prohibiting "lodging dwelling or sleeping", but
another clause restricting the use of premises to "showrooms,
workrooms and offices only" was retained. The defendant told the
plaintiff's agent that he would not sign the lease with a clause about
not sleeping there and that he wanted a clause inserted stating
expressly that he could sleep on the premises. The agent replied that
this was impossible because it was against the terms of the head
lease; this was in fact untrue but was held not to be fraudulent.
However, the agent later added that there would be no objection to
the defendant's continuing to reside there if he would sign the lease.
Six years later the plaintiff claimed forfeiture of the lease on the
ground that the defendant was residing on the premises in breach of
the covenant in the lease. Harman J. found that a promise had been
made to the defendant before the execution of the lease that, if he
would sign it in the form put before him, the landlord would not
enforce the covenant about using the premises for business purposes
only, and that it was in reliance on this promise that he executed the
lease. After rejecting the claim for rectification and the argument
14. Lysnar v. NationalBank ofNew ZealandLtd., [1935] N.Z.L.R. 129 (J.C.).
15. Byers v. McMillan (1887), 15 S.C.R. 194 (Man.); Hawrish v. Bank of
Montreal, [1969] S.C.R. 515 (Sask.).
16. Steine v. Mathieu, [1923] 3 W.W.R. 493 (Sask. C.A.); Spurr v. Grevatt,
[1923] 3 D.L.R. 137 (N.S.S.C.); Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co. v. Neely,
[195412 D.L.R. 154 (Man. C.A.);Kaplan v.Andrews, [195514 D.L.R. 553 (Ont.
C.A.); CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce v. Wilcox (1969), 68 W.W.R. 710
(Sask. Q.B.).
17. Carter v. Salmon (1880), 43 L.T. 490 (C.A.); Henderson v. Arthur, [1907] 1
K.B. 10 (C.A.); Horncastle v. The Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S.A.
(1906), 22 T.L.R. 735 (C.A.).
18. Hoyt's ProprietaryLtd. v. Spencer (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 (H.C. of A.);
Maybury v. Atlantic Union Oil Co. (1953), 89 C.L.R. 507 (H.C. of A.).
19. Bradshaw v. Fitzgerald, [1919] G.L.R. 78 (N.Z.S.C.); Hammond v.
Commissioneroflnland Revenue [1956] N.Z.L.R. 690 (S.C.).
20.[1959] Ch. 129; [195812 AI.E.R. 733.
21. Id. at 145-146.
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based upon equitable estoppel, he held that "there was a clear
contract acted upon by the defendant to his detriment and from
which the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to resile"21
This oral contract was clearly inconsistent with the terms of the
lease. The latter provided that the premises could only be used for
trade purposes, whereas the oral contract was that this covenant
would not be enforced and that the defendant could live on the
premises. The difficulty with the case is that Harman J. did not
actually refer to the contract as a "collateral contract" and neither
was reference made to the long line of authorities holding that a
collateral contract must not be inconsistent with the terms of the
principal contract. In particular, the objection can be raised that the
decision cannot be reconciled with a number of prior English Court
of Appeal decisions2 2 and the Privy Council decision in Lysnar v.
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd.2 3 The justice of the decision,
once the defendant's evidence was accepted, is, however, apparent.
The decision in Lysnar means that the New Zealand courts will
no doubt feel bound to uphold the requirement of consistency and
therefore will not follow Mudd. However, the Supreme Court of
Canada is no longer bound by decisions of the Privy Council, since
the abolition of appeals thereto. Nor is it apparently now bound by
its own previous decisions. 2 4 Accordingly, it is possible for the
Supreme Court to reject its decision in Hawrish v. Bank of
Montreal25 and follow Mudd. It will be suggested in the following
pages that this course ought to be adopted should the occasion arise
because there are no valid reasons why a collateral contract must be
entirely consistent with the terms of the principal written contract.
That a collateral contract could not contradict the parties' written
contract seems to have been regarded by the early courts as so
obvious as not to require explanation. They could conceive of
contracting parties making an oral arrangement on additionalpoints
but certainly not one which actually contradicted the written
agreement. Would not the parties alter the written agreement in the
latter case? The written form was seen as necessarily being the
dominant expression of the contract. The collateral contract was a
concession, contrary to the spirit of the parol evidence rule, and was
22. See cases cited note 17, supra.
23. [1935] N.Z.L.R. 129 (J.C.)
24. See generally, B. Laskin, The British Tradition in CanadianLaw (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1969) at 62-67.
25. [1969] S.C.R. 515; (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 600 (Sask.)

142 The Dalhousie Law Journal

not to be taken too far. However, once it is understood that the
object of evidence as to a collateral contract is to set up a separate
contract so that the parol evidence rule has no application, then
some other reason must be found for rendering a collateral contract
unenforceable on the ground of inconsistency with the principal
contract. Since the parol evidence rule does not apply to collateral
contracts, it cannot logically be appealed to as a justification for the
consistency requirement.
1. The Argument Based on the Doctrineof Consideration
It was briefly noted in Walker Property Investments (Brighton)
Ltd. v. Walker2 6 that where the alleged collateral contract
contradicts the principal contract, the promisee cannot show any
consideration for it. The Australian courts have adopted a similar
approach but have explained this objection in rather more detail.
The leading case is Hoyt's Pty. Ltd. v. Spencer,2 7 which was
expressly approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hawrish v.
Bank of Montreal.2 8 The defendant subleased certain premises to
the plaintiff for a period of four years, the lease providing that the
defendant might, at any time during the term, terminate the lease by
giving four weeks' notice in writing. Before the expiration of the
term the defendant did give the requisite notice. The plaintiff
brought an action claiming damages for breach of contract, alleging
that prior to the execution of the lease the defendant had promised
that, if the plaintiff would take the lease, he would not give notice
unless required to do so by the head-lessor. He further alleged that
he took the lease in reliance upon this promise and that the
defendant had not been required by the head-lessor to give notice. It
was held by the High Court of Australia that, assuming the prior
oral agreement had been made, nevertheless it was invalid and
unenforceable on the ground of inconsistency with the written
contract.
There can be no doubt that the two agreements were in conflict.
The lease gave the lessor the unqualified right to give the stipulated
notice, whereas the parol agreement limited that right; it was only to
arise upon a requirement made by the head-lessor. The reason why
26. (1947), 177 L.T. 204 at 206 (C.A.).
27. (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 (H.C. of A.).
28. [1969] S.C.R. 515; (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 600 (Sask.).
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this inconsistency rendered the prior agreement unenforceable was
29
explained by Isaacs J. as follows:
The main contract here, when utilized to form the consideration
for the collateral contract, must be taken exactly as it is. Its
provisions do not change according as it is considered as an
independent contract or as a consideration for the collateral
contract. A principle that must govern the bargain of a
contractual promise made in consideration of entering into the
main contract is that the parties shall have and be subject to all
(not some only) of the respective benefits and burdens of the
main contract.
Later he said: 30
being supplementary
The truth is that a collateral contract .
only to the main contract, cannot impinge on it, or alter its
provisions or the rights created by it; consequently, where the
main contract is relied on as the consideration in whole or part for
the promise contained in the collateral contract, it is a wholly
inconsistent and impossible contention that the other party is not
to have the full benefit of the main contract as made.
Similar reasoning was later adopted by the High Court in
Maybury v. Atlantic Union Oil Co. Ltd.31 The appellant, a
well-known radio personality, had entered into a written contract
with the respondent company to broadcast a number of commercial
radio programmes on its behalf. He claimed damages for breach of a
collateral agreement whereby the hours his programmes were to be
broadcast were not to coincide with broadcasts by another radio
personality. However, in the written contract there was a clause
stating that "the date, hour or time for each broadcast shall be as
determined by the company". The High Court refused to enforce
the alleged collateral contract on the ground that
if such a collateral agreement is to have effect as a contract it
must be consistent with the provisions of the main agreement, the
making of which by the other party provides the consideration. If
the promise sought to modify, control or restrict the principal
agreement it would detractfrom2 the very considerationwhich is
alleged to supportthe promise.3
The view taken in both these cases is that the assumption of all
the obligations under the written contract can be the only
29. (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 at 145-146 (H.C. of A.)

30. Id. at 147.
31. (1953), 89 C.L.R. 507 (H.C. of A.)
32. Id. at 517. Emphasis added.
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consideration for a collateral contract. Of course, if this is the
correct view then, where the collateral contract is inconsistent with
the terms of the written contract, the consideration for the former
will be illusory. If A promises B that he will not broadcast B's
programme at a certain time in consideration of B's entering into a
written contract, one term of which gives A complete discretion as
to the times of broadcast, what is B's legal position? If A breaks his
promise and B sues for breach of a collateral contract, A will query
the consideration for the promise. B will reply, "my entering into
the written contract", but he then faces the difficulty that part of
that consideration is the promise to permit A to broadcast the
programmes at any time. If he refuses to allow A to do so, he is
failing to observe his obligations under the principal contract.
However, it is suggested that the view adopted by the High Court
that the assumption of all the obligations under the written contract
can be the only consideration for a collateral contract cannot be
supported. It is true that, when a collateral contract is inconsistent
with the terms of the principal contract, it cannot be argued that the
assumption of all the obligations under that contract provides
consideration for the collateral contract. But why must it be all or
nothing? Cannot the promisee argue that the assumption of the
obligations under the principal contract, other than those negatived
by the oral agreement, provides adequate consideration?
The approach of Isaacs J. in Hoyt's Pty. Ltd. v. Spencer was
based upon the traditional conception, arising from the early cases,
of a collateral contract as being necessarily "supplementary only to
the main contract" 3 3 and therefore, by definition, not being
inconsistent therewith. This has largely resulted from the use of the
word "collateral" which has unfortunate connotations in that it
suggests something that stands side by side with the main
contract, springing out of it and fortifying it. But.

.

.the purpose

of the device usually is to enforce a promise given prior to the
main contract and but for which this main contract would not
have been
made. It is rather a preliminary than a collateral
34
contract.
The natural result of this general usage of the word "collateral" to
describe what is in truth a "preliminary" contract has been that the
subsequent written contract has always been regarded as necessarily
33. (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 at 147 (H.C. of A.).
34. Cheshire & Fifoot, The Law of Contract(2d. Aust. ed. Sydney: Butterworths,
1969) at 144.
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dominant, as governing the operation of the preliminary oral
contract, despite the fact that the latter exists as a separate legal
contract. Why should this be so? Prior to the conclusion of the
"collateral" contract, there is no binding written contract and since,
without the collateral contract, the written contract would never
have been entered into, is it not more realistic to regard the first
contract as having been intended to govern the operation of the
subsequent written contract? Since the objective of the court is to
determine the true intention of the parties, it is manifest, once it is
clearly established that an oral contract was made the consideration
for which was the entry into a later written contract, that the
intention of the parties must have been that the oral contract was to
prevail in the event of its being inconsistent with the terms of the
written contract.
Furthermore, it is suggested that there is no valid reason why,
when the entry into a written contract is utilised as the consideration
for the entry into another contract, the benefits and burdens of the
former must remain completely intact, as stated by Isaacs J. in
Hoyt's Pty. Ltd. v. Spencer. The test of whether a contract, the
consideration for which was agreed upon as the entry into another
contract, can stand should not be whether each of the parties can get
the full benefit of the later contract as drawn up. The real question
should be viewing the terms of the first contract in the light of the
terms of the second contract, is there adequate consideration to
supportthe first contract?
When the "preliminary" contract is inconsistent in some respects
with the terms of the principal contract, then, if enforceable, it has
the effect of reducing the value of the consideration that the
promisor will get from the principal contract. However, this does
not mean that there is no consideration at all for the preliminary
contract. What the promisee can argue is that the consideration is
not the assumption of all the obligations under the principal
contract, but the assumption of such obligations as are not
inconsistent with what the promisor agreed to under the first
contract. Indeed, once that contract has been proved to the court's
satisfaction, it is manifestly absurd to analyse the transaction in any
other way. Otherwise, if the High Court approach is adopted, the
preliminary contract must be regarded as if the promisor said, for
example, "I promise not to do this in consideration of your
promising to let me do it." The only realistic analysis is that the
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promisor has waived in advance certain of his rights contained or to
be contained in the written contract.
In this light, it will be useful to reconsider the basic facts in
Hoyt's case. A says to B, "I will sign this lease only if you promise
that you will not give notice unless event C occurs". If it happens
that the lease includes a covenant that B may give four weeks'
notice at any time, the prior oral agreement ought to be construed as
if B has promised not to enforce that covenant except in event C.
Furthermore, it is suggested that A's promise to sign the lease and
therefore, implicitly, to comply with the various terms set out
therein, except any relating to notice, ought to be regarded as
providing adequate consideration for the oral agreement.
If the attention of the lessee in Hoyt's case had been expressly
drawn to the provision in the lease relating to notice, it is possible
that the preliminary agreement might have been expressed rather
differently. The lessee may have said, "I will sign this lease if you
promise not to enforce clause 10 relating to notice unless event C
occurs". Adequate consideration can more easily be inferred when
the preliminary agreement is actually expressed in terms of a
promise not to enforce the inconsistent covenant in the principal
contract. A benefit accrues to the lessor in that the lessee will sign
the lease and abide by all the covenants, albeit except clause 10.
The detriment to the lessee is that he commits himself to lease the
premises on the terms set out, again except clause 10.
2. A Question of Weight
In the situation just considered, the more natural and usual way of
carrying out the oral agreement would have been by amending
clause 10 of the lease. However, this should not automatically
render the oral agreement unenforceable or evidence of it
inadmissible. It indicates perhaps that the alleged oral agreement
was never made, but it is not conclusive. Other evidence may
satisfactorily explain why the parties did not adopt the ordinary
course of altering the written document. Maybe they were reluctant
to alter a formal looking document prepared by their legal advisers,
or one of the parties legitimately wanted to keep the term a secret
from his relatives or other third parties. Perhaps the lessee was too
embarrassed to ask for an amendment lest he be met by a testy
reply, "Do you doubt my word?" Anyway, the long history of
litigation on the parol evidence rule indicates that contracting
parties, for reasons best known to themselves, have often not
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adopted what might appear from the outside to be the ordinary
course of amending their written agreement in order to bring it more
into line with their actual agreement. Therefore, it is suggested that
the failure of the parties to amend the principal contract is a matter
which goes only to weight. The courts ought always to be more
prepared to accept evidence of an additional agreement (something
on a topic not covered at all in the writing) than of a contradictory
oral agreement, but if the evidence satisfies the court that the latter
agreement was concluded, it ought to be enforced.
It is not possible to explain Hoyt's case on the basis that the oral
agreement was not proved. The High Court assumed for the
purposes of its decision that the oral agreement had in fact been
made, so that no question of the likelihood of it not having been
made arose. It is therefore suggested that the case was wrongly
decided and ought not to be followed.
In his judgment in Hoyt's case, Knox C. J. gave the following
example of an inconsistent collateral contract which was
35
unenforceable.
I will sign a contract to pay you £1,000 for a house, £250 in cash
and the balance by promissory notes at 12, 24 and 36 months, if
in consideration of my signing that contract you will enter into an
agreement with me that you will not seek to enforce payment of
the £250 cash or delivery of the agreed promissory notes but will
accept other promissory notes of different amounts and currency.
It is suggested that even in this rather extreme example adequate
consideration for the oral contract can be discerned. The purchaser
at least suffers the detriment of being obliged to purchase the house
and to eventually pay £1,000 for it, and the seller gets a
corresponding benefit. The fact that it is very unlikely that the
parties would have made such an agreement without altering the
written contract is a matter that goes to weight. Cogent evidence
would be required. However, if the purchaser can establish the
existence of the oral agreement, and this will generally involve his
explaining to the court's satisfaction why the written contract
remained unaltered, it should be enforced.
It is not suggested that all the cases where the courts refused to
uphold an oral agreement as a collateral contract on the ground of
inconsistency were wrongly decided. Indeed, in the writer's
opinion, it is on the ground that no collateral contract was made out
35. (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 at 140 (H.C. of A.).
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on the facts that the actual decision of the Privy Council inLysnar v.
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. 36 can be justified. The facts
were rather unusual and it is necessary to set them out in some
detail. The plaintiff owned a sheep-station which was mortgaged to
the East Coast Commissioner. The venture had proved unsuccessful
and the Commissioner put the property up for sale and bought it in.
The defendant bank had also made heavy advances to the plaintiff
which were outstanding, the principal security being a mortgage
over the stock. Both the plaintiff and the defendant wanted to avoid
a forced sale of the stock which, at the time, would not have realised
nearly enough to pay off the debt. Negotiations took place between
the plaintiff and the Commissioner, with the plaintiff of necessity
keeping the defendant informed as to developments. Finally, the
Commissioner by letter dated 29 April, offered the plaintiff a lease
of the land on the terms set out therein. The letter required the
defendant to assist the plaintiff either by joining in a tripartite
agreement or by making an agreement with the plaintiff to do what
was necessary on its part to carry out the Commissioner's
conditions. These conditions prohibited the defendant from
controlling the management and finance of the station, the object
being to preclude the defendant from applying significant amounts
of the revenue towards reduction of its debt.
On 1 May, the manager of the defendant bank, a Mr. Grose,
signed and handed a letter to the plaintiff agreeing to assist him in
terms of the Commissioner's letter. The plaintiff immediately took
this letter to the Commissioner and then accepted his offer. On 2
May, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff stating, in effect, that it
was a condition of its providing financial assistance that the bank
was to control the management and finances of the station.
Although this letter was clearly inconsistent with the terms of the
Commissioner's letter, the bank did not send a copy of it to the
Commissioner and neither was he warned that the bank was alleging
a different agreement from that contained in its letter of 1 May. On
the contrary, the bank, on 4 May, wrote to the Commissioner
confirming the contents of that letter.
Upon receiving the bank's letter of 2 May, the plaintiff replied
denying the condition as to management, whereupon the bank
repudiated the arrangement. On 14 May, the bank finally sent a
copy of its letter of 2 May to the Commissioner and stated that, as
36. [1935] N.Z.L.R. 129 (J.C.).
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the plaintiff would not agree to the conditions set out, the
negotiations were at an end. As a result the Commissioner refused
to grant the lease and the plaintiff sued for damages for breach of
contract. Before the Privy Council, the defendant alleged that, if its
letter of 1 May must be regarded as a contract in writing, there was
concluded at the same time a collateral oral contract in the terms
afterwards set out in the letter of 2 May. However, it was held that
evidence of the collateral oral contract was inadmissible since it was
inconsistent with the terms of the contract in writing.
This decision can be supported on the alternative ground given by
the Privy Council, viz. that it was inconceivable that the alleged oral
37
agreement was in fact made. Lord Wright said.
In this case it is not easy to reconcile with the idea of the
suggested oral agreement the fact that Mr. Grose signed the letter
he did sign, with the intention that it should be passed on to the
Commissioner, who, as he knew, had taken a strong stand
throughout on the question of management. He intended his letter
to be shown to the Commissioner as the condition on which a
lease should be granted; if he had intended to insist on the terms
quoted above which appeared in the letter of 2 May 1931, in
particular, the terms putting him in the position of a mortgagee in
possession, and about management and control, it is scarcely
credible that he would not have expressed them in his letter which
he wrote at the interview ...Their Lordships have felt some
difficulty in understanding why, if Mr. Grose was insisting that
what he agreed was contained in the letter of 2 May 1931, he did
not at once inform the Commissioner, instead of waiting to do so
until he had decided to repudiate the whole transaction, and why
on that assumption he came to write to the Commissioner the
letter of 4 May 1931.
Such was the nature of the transaction and the subsequent conduct
of the defendant that it was inconceivable that the oral agreement
was made. The surrounding circumstances clearly indicated that the
bank had had a change of heart and was seeking a way out. The only
other possibility was that the parties fraudulently intended to
deceive the Commissioner which, obviously, the defendant was not
in a position to argue.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada inHawrishv. Bank
of Montreal38 can also be supported on the ground that no collateral
contract was made out on the facts. Hawrish executed a guarantee of
a company's indebtedness to the bank. The guarantee stated that it
37. Id. at 141-142.
38. [1969] S.C.R. 515; (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 600 (Sask).
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was to be continuing and to cover existing as well as future
indebtedness of the company up to $6000. It also contained a clause
whereby the guarantor acknowledged that no representations had
been made to him on behalf of the bank. However, Hawrish alleged
that he received an oral assurance from the assistant manager of the
bank that the guarantee was to cover existing indebtedness only and
that he would be released from his guarantee when the bank
obtained a joint guarantee from the directors of the debtor company.
He argued that parol evidence of this oral agreement was admissible
since it amounted to a collateral contract. It was held that the alleged
collateral contract was unenforceable since it clearly contradicted
the terms of the written guarantee. However, Judson J. did state that
he was not convinced that the evidence clearly indicated the
necessary contractual intention. Although it was not in issue he was
disposed to agree with the view of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal on this point.2 9 There Hall J. A. held that Hawrish had not
40
established
a clear contract or undertaking on the part of the [bank] not to
rely on the rights set out in the guarantee but rather to discharge
[him] when the directors had signed the guarantee, and further
that [he] relied upon such undertaking and would not have
executed the guarantee without it.
In other words, Hawrish had not discharged the onus of proving the
necessary animus contrahendi, as required by Lord Moulton in
41
Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton.
3. Some FurtherArguments
There are a number of subsidiary arguments that can also be
raised against allowing inconsistency to operate as a bar to the
enforcement of a collateral contract. These mainly relate to the
problem of distinguishing, on the basis of the courts' decisions on
various aspects of the parol evidence rule, between what is a
contradiction and what is merely additional or supplemental to the
terms of a written contract. Although expressly recognised on a few
occasions, 42 no detailed consideration of the problem has ever been
39. Id. at 520.
40. (1967), 61 W.W.R. 16 at22 (Sask. C.A.).
41. [1913]A.C. 30at47(H.L.).
42. Lysnar v. National Bank of New Zealand Ltd., [1935] N.Z.L.R. 129 at 140
(S.C.); Hammond v. C.I.R., [1956] N.Z.L.R. 690 at 696 (S.C.).
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attempted in the collateral contract cases. However, some indication
of the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between a contradiction
and a mere addition to or variation of the terms of a written
contract can be seen from an examination of the cases in which the
courts have considered whether a term should be implied into a
written contract by reference to a custom or usage prevailing in a
particular locality or trade.
4. ParolEvidence ofImplied Terms
The parol evidence rule only applies to the express terms of a
written contract. It prevents the variation or contradiction of the
express terms and the addition of orally agreed terms, but has no
application to implied terms which courts sometimes read into
contracts by reference to the presumed intention of the parties.
Therefore, parol evidence is admissible, without contravening the
parol evidence rule, to prove the existence of facts and
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract which are
relevant in determining whether or not an implied term ought to be
read into the contract.
The courts have stipulated that an implied term must not
contradict the written terms. However, this is not a result of the
parol evidence rule. Since the implication of a term into a contract
rests upon the assumption that it represents the intention of the
parties, it must necessarily be excluded if the express terms of the
contract disclose a contrary intention.
The cases on terms implied from custom, in particular, show how
the courts have never come to grips with the concept of
contradiction. Of course, in some of the cases, the custom did quite
clearly contradict the express terms. These were cases where the
written contract specifically dealt with the very subject matter of the
custom. Thus, in Palgrave, Brown & Son Ltd. v. Owners of S. S.
Turid3 a charterparty provided that the risk and expenses of
discharging the cargo should be borne by the charterer and it was
held that a custom whereby the risk and expenses were to be borne
by the shipowner was inconsistent with the charterparty and,
accordingly, could not be enforced. 44 Another case where there was
a clear contradiction is Les Affreteurs Reunis Societe Anonyme v. L.
43. [1922] 1 A.C. 397 (H.L.).
44. See also Rederi Aktiebolaget Acolus v. W. N. Hillas & Co. (1927), 136 L.T.
385 (H.L.).

152 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Walford (London) Ltd. 4 A clause in a charterparty provided that the
respondent, a broker, who had negotiated the charterparty on behalf
of the charterers, was entitled to a commission on the estimated
gross amount of hire on signing the charter. It was held that the
shipowners could not set up a custom whereby commission was
payable only ifhire was earned under the charterparty since it
46
contradicted the terms of the clause.
These are clear cases but others are not so easy to reconcile. The
courts have pointed out that
merely that it varies the apparent contract is not enough to
exclude the evidence; for it is impossible to add any material
incident to the written
terms of a contract without altering its
47
effect, more or less.
However, there are many situations where the distinction between
what varies or adds to the written terms and what contradicts them
is difficult to draw. As Treitel points out, the matter is often
"largely one of emphasis".48
In Webb v. Plummer4 9 the custom of the country dictated that an
out-going tenant was entitled to an allowance for foldage ("a mode
of manuring the ground' ' 5 from an in-coming tenant. It was held
that an express stipulation in a lease whereby other payments were
to be made by the in-coming tenant excluded the implication of the
custom. Because the lease made express provision for certain
payments this was taken to be an exhaustive list. However, it is
arguable that the custom did not contradict the express terms of the
lease since it made no reference to foldage whatsoever - it did not
deal with the very subject matter of the custom.
Webb v. Plummer illustrates that whether parol evidence
contradicts the written terms will often depend upon the
starting-point adopted. The court could have chosen either of two
possible criteria against which to assess whether or not the written
terms excluded the custom. They were either (a) reference to
payment forfoldage, or (b) reference to payment of any type. The
45. [1919]A.C. 801 (H.L.).
46. For another clear instance, see Summers v. The Commonwealth (1918), 25
C.L.R. 144 (H.C. of A.).
47. Brown v. Byrne (1854), 3 El. & B1. 703 at 715-716; 118 E.R. 1304 at 1309
(per Coleridge J.) (Q.B.D.).
48. The Law of Contract (3d ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1970) at 156.
49. (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 746; 106 E.R. 537 (K.B.D.).
50. Hutton v. Warren (1836) 1 M.& W. 466 at 477; 150 E.R. 517 at 522 (per
Parke B) (Exch.).
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court chose the latter, which was much wider. However, it could
equally well have chosen the narrower criterion (reference to
payment for foldage) and said that, since the contract only dealt
with other payments and not with the exact subject matter of the
custom, it was not inconsistent with the written terms. Let us
assume that a written contract provides that a payment shall be made
upon the happening of events A. B. and C. On one possible view, it
is clearly inconsistent therewith to allege that there is a further event
D. upon which payment is to be made. If, on the other hand, the
criterion adopted is whether the contract anywhere refers to event
D, then it ig not inconsistent with the written terms to introduce
evidence thereof, since they only deal with events A. B. and C.
Indeed, some of the subsequent cases have adopted this latter
approach. Two good illustrations are Hutton v. Warren51 and
2
Brown v. Byrne. In Hutton v. Warren a custom of the country entitled the tenant of
a farm to receive, on quitting, a reasonable allowance for seeds and
labour spent on the arable land in the last year of his tenancy. The
lease contained an express stipulation that the tenant was to
consume three-quarters of the hay and straw upon the farm and
spread the manure arising therefrom; the landlord was to pay a
reasonable price for any manure left over at the end of the term. It
was argued that since the lease expressly dealt with payment for the
tenant on his quitting, this was the only payment to be made.
However, the court rejected this argument holding that the custom
did not contradict the written terms which dealt with manuring only,
not with sowing and ploughing as did the custom. Webb v. Plummer
was distinguished on the ground that5 3
no doubt could exist in that case but that the language of the lease
was equivalent to a stipulation that the lessor should pay for the
things mentioned, and no more.
Instead of measuring inconsistency against whether the lease
specified any payments upon quitting, the Court chose the narrower
criterion of whether the lease dealt with the very subject of the
custom - payment for seeds and labour.
In Brown v. Byrne there was a contract to pay freight on delivery
at a certain rate per pound. By custom the shipowner was bound to
51. Supra.
52. (1854), 3 El. & B1. 703; 118 E.R. 1304 (Q.B.D.).
53. (1836), 1 M. & W. 477; 150 E.R. 522 (perParke B) (Ex ch.).
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allow three months' discount but he refused on the ground that the
custom was not binding in law as it contradicted the written
contract. It was held that the shipowner must allow the deduction.
54
Coleridge J. said:
The written contract expressly settles the rate of payment: the
custom does not set this aside; indeed it adopts it, as that upon
which it is to act, by establishing a claim for allowance of
discount upon freight to be paid after that rate. The consignee
undertakes to pay freight on delivery after that rate; the
shipowner undertakes to allow three months' discount on freight
paid after that rate; the latter contract is dependent on the former,
but is not repugnant to it.
This case emphasises the difficulty of distinguishing between mere
additions and contradictions. In effect, the contract provided for
payment at one rate and the custom for payment at another, so that
the custom did contradict the contract. However, the court avoided
this conclusion by holding that the custom merely added to the
written terms because the discount was calculated on the rate of
freight specified in the contract. It is difficult to accept this
reasoning because the custom did effectively reduce the freight
payable.
Compare the decisions in Webb v. Plummer and Brown v. Byrne.
If a contract provides that payment shall be made upon the
occurrence of events A. B. and C., and a party alleges that there is
an event D. upon which payment is to be made also, then, following
Webb v. Plummer, such evidence contradicts the written contract.
Yet, if there is an obligation to pay money at a certain rate per
pound, it is not contradictory of the written contract to allege that
three months' discount is to be allowed so that a lesser sum is due. It
is suggested that no real distinction can be drawn between these two
situations.
The essential differences between Webb v. Plummer, on the one
hand, and Hutton v. Warren and Brown v. Byrne, on the other, is
one of approach. In Webb v. Plummer, the court applied the
presumption of completeness against the party alleging the
additional customary term and accordingly adopted the wider
criterion against which to measure inconsistency. Whereas, in
Hutton v. Warren, the Court, from the outset, was more willing to
entertain the prospect of customary terms and in fact emphasised
"the principle of presumption that, in such transactions, the parties
54. (1854), 3 El. & B. 716; 118 E.R. 1309, (Q.B.D.).
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did not mean to express in writing the whole of the contract by
which they intended to be bound, but a contract with reference to
those known usages". 5 5 Accordingly, the narrower criterion was
adopted. Similarly, in Brown v. Byrne Coleridge J. emphasised that
parties to mercantile contracts "commonly reduce into writing the
special particulars of their agreement, but omit to specify these
known usages, which are included however, as of course, by mutual
56
understanding."
Later cases adopted this latter approach. In Humfrey v. Dale57
Lord Campbell C. J. proposed the following test of inconsistency:
"To fall within the exception, therefore, of repugnancy, the incident
must be such as if expressed in the written contract would make it
insensible . . ." This test approves the narrower criterion against
which inconsistency might be measured. It means that a custom will
be inconsistent with the written terms only when they deal expressly
with the very subject matter of the custom. The test involves reading
the custom with the alleged contradictory terms, 'in order to see
whether the two can sensibly stand together. Applying it to Webb v.
Plummer, the contract would not have been "insensible" since it
made no reference to payment for foldage.
Lord Campbell's test has been approved in subsequent cases. 5 8
However, unfortunately, it has been applied as excluding a custom
when the very subject matter of that custom was not expressly dealt
with in the written contract.
In London Export CorporationLtd. v. Jubilee Coffee Roasting
Co. Ltd. 59 a written contract for the sale of goods contained a clause
providing that in case of a dispute, arbitration was to be conducted
according to the rules of a certain association which were appended
thereto. Each party could appoint an arbitrator and the arbitrators, if
they disagreed, could appoint an umpire. A party dissatisfied with
the umpire's award had a right of appeal to a special board. The
rules also provided that no one who had acted as an arbitrator or
umpire could be appointed a member of the board of appeal. In the
present case, at the hearing of an appeal by the buyers against the
55. (1836), 1 M& W. 475; 150 E.R. 521 per Parke B. (Exch.).
56. (1854), 3 El. & BI. 715; 118 E.R. 1309 (Q.B.D.).
57. (1857), 7 El. & BI. 266 at 275; 119 E.R. 1246 at 1249 (K.B.D.).
58. Myers v. Sarl (1860) 3 El. & El. 306 at 319-320; 121 E.R. 457 at 462 (K.B.);
Westacott v. Hahn, [1918] 1 K.B. 495 at 514 (C.A.); Palgrave, Brown & Son Ltd.
v. OwnersofS.S. Turid, [1922] 1 A.C. 397 at 406 (H.L.).
59. [1958] 1 W.L.R. 661; [195812 All E.R. 411 (C.A.).
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umpire's award, the chairman of the board asked the umpire to
remain with the board after the parties had retired. The buyers'
objection was overruled by the chairman on the ground that it was
the customary practice of the association, which had prevailed for
many years and was well known to all persons in the trade, to ask
the umpire to remain and confer with the board. However, the Court
of Appeal set aside the board's award in favour of the sellers on the
ground that the presence of the umpire was contrary to the rules
relating to the conduct of arbitration proceedings. These rules were
terms of the parties' contract and the custom was inconsistent
therewith.
It is suggested that the custom did not directly contradict the
rules. They merely provided that an umpire could not be appointed a
member of the board of appeal, and were silent as to whether the
board could confer with an umpire. The court adopted a similar
approach to that in Webb v. Plummer and adopted a wider criterion
against which to assess whether or not the custom contradicted the
60
written terms, viz, the course of proceedings defined by the rules:
The rules as to arbitration here indicate a two-stage arbitration:
first, by the arbitrators, or upon the arbitrator's disagreeing, by
an umpire; and secondly, by the appeal board at the instance of
the dissatisfied party. That is to be the course of the proceedings
• . . The proceedings contemplated are proceedings in those two

stages, and, in my view, it would be repugnant to introduce a
third stage in the form of a conference between the appeal board
and the umpire.
By adopting a narrower criterion, viz., whether the contract dealt
with the very subject matter of the custom, it could have been held
that the custom did not contradict the written terms. They only
provided that an umpire could not be appointed a member of the
board and were silent as to whether he could confer with the board.
The court was obviously reluctant to give effect to such a custom
as it smacked of a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Accordingly, as in Webb v. Plummer, it applied the presumption of
completeness against the party alleging the additional customary
term and adopted the wider criterion against which to assess
inconsistency. Whereas, in the previous cases the courts presumed
the opposite - that the parties did in fact intend to contract with
reference to the custom - and, in order to give effect to that
custom, a narrower criterion was adopted.
60. Id. at 675 (per Jenkins L.J.) Emphasis added.
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"Contradiction" is such a variable notion that the courts are able
to reach the desired conclusion in accordance with what they
consider the parties ought to have intended by adopting the
appropriate terms of reference. Of course, similar problems do arise
in other areas of the law of contract. For example, whether a
mistake renders an object different in kind depends upon which
category you decide the object originally belonged to. This, in turn,
depends upon the level of generality at which you abstract the
original category: e.g. is the subject matter of the contract "an old
master" or is it just "a painting". In the present context, the
difficulty of distinguishing between a contradiction and a variation
or addition is merely put forward as one of the reasons for not
accepting the rule that a collateral contract must not contradict the
principal contract.
The problem is further accentuated if the courts' reasoning in
some of their decisions on other aspects of the parol evidence rule is
accepted. Apparently inconsistent oral agreements have been
upheld on the ground that they merely make an addition to the
written terms.
5. The Consideration"Exception"
It is well established that, despite the parol evidence rule,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the existence of
consideration where none is stated or to supplement the expressed
consideration, so long as it does not contradict the written
contract. 6 1 However, the cases have emphasised that it is not a
contradiction of a written contract to prove a larger consideration
than that which is stated in it. Thus, parol evidence has been
admitted to show that the true consideration was £1,500 and not
62
£ 1,050 as stated in the written contract.
Although their authority is beyond challenge, it is very difficult to
accept the courts' reasoning in the "consideration" cases. Parol
61. Clifford v. Turrell (1845), 14 L.J. Ch. 390; Frith v. Frith, [1906] A.C. 254
(J.C.);Turner v. Forwood, [1951] 1 All E.R. 746 (C.A.); Marsh v. Hunt (1884), 9
O.A.R. 595.
62. Hawke v. Edwards (1948), 48 S.R. (N.S.W.) 21 (N.S.W.S.C. In Banco). See
alsoMullengerv. Mullenger, [1922] N.Z.L.R. 510 (S.C.) (true consideration 118
as opposed to 60) and Marsh v. Hunt, supra, note 61 ( 7500 as opposed to
5000). Cf. Firmin v. Public Trustee (1889), 7 N.Z.L.R. 277 (S.C.) (true
consideration 209 not 360 as stated in the deed). This was a clear extension of the
previous cases which permitted evidence of an additionalconsideration only. The
evidence clearly contradicted the deed.
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evidence is said to be admissible to prove a further consideration
which is consistent with the consideration stated on the face of the
document. It is not inconsistent with or a contradiction of an
instrument to prove a larger consideration than that which is stated
in it. Thus, an obligation to pay £30 is said to be consistent with an
obligation to pay £28.63 This line of reasoning is untenable. It
cannot be said, for example, that, if the price specified in the
writing is $10, it is not contradictory of this obligation to allege that
in fact the real price is $20. Although the original obligation in a
sense still subsists, the obligation to pay the larger amount is quite
clearly inconsistent with an obligation to pay the lesser sum." It is
surprising that the contrary view has so often been accepted without
question.
Similar reasoning to that in the consideration cases was adopted
by the Court of Common Pleas in Malpas v. London and South
Western Railway Co., 65 a remarkable case which typifies much of
the confusion which has marked the courts' consideration of the
parol evidence rule. The defendant company orally agreed to carry
the plaintiff's cattle to King's Cross station. The plaintiff signed a
consignment note, which he did not read, providing that the cattle
were only to be sent to Nine Elms, an intermediate station on the
line to King's Cross. The cattle were left at the former station and
the plaintiff sued for damages. It was held that parol evidence was
admissible to show that the defendant had agreed to carry the cattle
to King's Cross on the ground that the evidence "does not vary or
contradict the written document, but only makes an addition to
it.,,6 6

63. As inR. v. Scammonden (1789), 3. T.R. 474; 100 E.R. 685 (K.B.D.).
64. See Peacock v. Monk (1748) 1 Ves. Sen. 127 at 128; 27 E.R. 934 at 935
(Ch.D.) where Lord Hardwicke L. C. said that "where any consideration is
mentioned ... if it is not said also and for other considerations,you cannot enter
into proof of any other; the reason is because it would be contrary to the deed; for
when the deed says, it is in consideration of such a particular thing, that imports the
whole consideration, and is negative to any other." This eminently sensible dictum
was regarded as so astray in Clifford v. Turrall, (1845) L.J. Ch. 398 that the old
argument was raised that Lord Hardwicke may have been misreported!
See also Prestonv. Merceau (1775), 2 Black W. 1249 at 1250; 96 E.R. 736 (K.B.)
where Blackstone J. held that parol evidence "never ought to be suffered, so as to
contradict or explain away an explicit agreement". He then exclaimed: "Here is a
positive agreement that the tenant shall pay 26. Shall we admit proof that this
means 28 12s 6d.?"
65. (1866), L.R.1 C.P. 336.
66. Id., at 339 (per Erle C.J.) Willes J. concurred.
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This reasoning can be challenged on a number of grounds. Even
if the evidence did not contradict the written document, it at least
had the effect of varying it by making a physical addition to the
contract journey. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule, as usually
formulated, extends beyond evidence varying or contradicting, to
that adding to, the terms of the written contract. However, more
important for present purposes, the parol evidence did in fact
contradict the written terms. If a contract of carriage specifies that
goods are to be carried to a destinationfive miles away, it is clearly
contradictory of that contract to say that they must in fact be carried
ten miles. So, it must be contradictory of a contractual obligation to
carry goods to Nine Elms station, to say that they must in fact be
taken further along the line to King's Cross.
6. Some Cases Where InconsistentCollateralContractsUpheld
There have also been some collateral contract cases where the
oral contract has been upheld when it was clearly inconsistent with
the terms of the written contract, despite the court's insistence on
the requirement that it ought not to be.
The very first collateral contract case, Lindley v. Lacey, 67is one
notable instance of a court insisting on the requirement of
consistency but then upholding a collateral contract which was in
fact inconsistent with the terms of the written contract. The
collateral contract was a promise by the plaintiff to sign a written
contract for the sale of his business to the defendant if the latter
promised to settle an action brought against him by one Chase.
However, the written contract contained the following clause "Lindley authorises Lacey to settle the action Chase v. Lindley".
This clause on its face gave the defendant an option as to whether he
settled the action, whereas the collateral contract took away this
option and obliged him to do so. It was therefore quite inconsistent
with one of the terms of the written contract. Strangely, none of the
judgments referred to the clause. It may have been open to the court
to interpret the word "authorises" as meaning "requires", since it
hardly makes much sense to go to the trouble of inserting a term in a
contract for the sale of a business which merely gives the purchaser
an option to discharge one of the vendor's debts. However, the
court cannot be said to have so interpreted it because this would
have removed the need for finding a collateral contract.
67. (1864) 17 C.B. (N.S.) 578; 144 E.R. 232 (C.P.).
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The collateral contract in Erskine v. Adeane6 8 was also
inconsistent with the written contract. The court upheld as a
collateral contract a promise by the lessor of a farm that he would
kill down the game and not let the shooting during the tenancy.
However, it appears from the report that
the lease reserved to the lessor, his heirs and assigns, the
exclusive right to all game and fish, and to preserve the same,
and by himself and themselves, his and their friends and servants,
to enter upon the premises and to shoot and sport over the same
69

The collateral contract was clearly inconsistent with this term
which, (a) entitled the lessor to assign to others the right to shoot the
game, and (b) gave the lessor an option to preserve the game. It is to
be noted that the defendant in this case had refused to alter the lease
because he wanted to keep the leases of all his properties uniform.
Therefore, the inference could easily have been drawn that there
was a promise by the defendant not to assert his rights under the
above quoted clause. The case was rightly decided but it cannot be
supported on the ground that the collateral contract was consistent
with the terms of the lease.
7. InconsistencyMay Depend Upon Way Agreement Expressed
A final reason for not regarding inconsistency as a bar to the
enforcement of a collateral contract is that it may be purely
fortuitous that the contract is actually expressed in terms
inconsistent with the principal contract. The classic instance of a
collateral contract is that given by Lord Moulton in Heilbut, Symons
70
& Co. v. Buckleton:
If you will make such and such a contract I will give you one
hundred pounds.
Therefore, it follows that there is a valid collateral contract where
A. says to B,
If you will sign this written contract for the sale of your car
[which states the purchase price at $500] I will pay you $100.
Why should there not be a valid collateral contract where the
evidence shows that, in fact, A said to B,
If you sign this contract I will pay you $600 instead of $500?
68. (1873) 8 Ch. App. 756.
69. Id. at 758. Emphasis added.
70. [1913]A.C. 30at47(H.L.).
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The above illustrations amount to different ways of saying the
same thing, yet, on the authorities, the latter would be
unenforceable as a collateral contract since the obligation to pay
$600 is clearly inconsistent with an obligation to pay $500.71 It is
suggested that in both the above examples A's promise ought to be
enforceable as a collateral contract. Their effect is the same - to
increase the consideration of the principal contract by $100. Of
course, the more natural and usual way of carrying out both
agreements would be by modifying the principal contract, but that is
a matter that goes to weight and should not be regarded as rendering
evidence of either collateral contract inadmissible or rendering them
unenforceable for want of consideration.
72
The decision in Hammond v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
provides another illustration of a situation where, if the parties had
actually adopted an alternative way of expressing their agreement, it
would have been invalid on the ground of inconsistency with the
principal contract. A mortgage was executed subject to an alleged
collateral oral agreement that the mortgagor was to receive a credit
of £800 against the sum advanced in respect of work previously
73
performed by him. Turner J. stated:
I agree that it is difficult to draw the line between cases where the
parties simply execute a mortgage for £2,000, agreeing orally
that only £1,200 is to be payable ... and cases where the parties
execute such a mortgage, but agree that a claim which the
mortgagor has already outstanding against the mortgagee shall
survive and be available as a credit against the sum advanced: but
there does seem to me to be a distinction.
Since the agreement was expressed in the latter form it was
enforceable as a collateral contract. However, it appears that, if the
parties' agreement had been that only £1,200 of the £2,000
mortgage advance was to be repaid, the agreement would have been
unenforceable because inconsistent with the principal contract.
Although, as Turner J. says, there may be a distinction between the
two possible agreements, it is suggested that there is not a sufficient
distinction to justify a different result in each case. The parties
might just as easily have adopted one method of expressing their
agreement as the other. The enforceability of an agreement ought

71. Unless the reasoning in the "consideration" cases is accepted.
72. [1956] N.Z.L.R. 690 (S.C.).
73. Id. at 696.
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not to depend upon which of two alternative methods the parties
adopt to express what is, in effect, the same transaction.
III. An Alternative EnforcementRoute
The object of this article has been to suggest that inconsistency
ought not to operate as a bar to the enforcement of an oral agreement
as a collateral contract where the making of the oral agreement has
been proved to the court's satisfaction. However, it must be
conceded that the long line of authorities to the contrary means that
the courts will probably not feel free to accept this suggestion.
Fortunately, there is an alternative way open to them to enforce
inconsistent oral agreements, if the propositions in the following
pages as to the modern scope of the parol evidence rule are
accepted. Furthermore, so conflicting and confused are the cases in
this area, there seemingly being authority for every possible shade
of opinion as to the operation of the rule, that an argument in court
along the lines of this alternative approach stands a greater chance
of being accepted.
1. The Written Contract
Most of the difficulties with the parol evidence rule have resulted
from a failure to distinguish between the applicability of the rule
and its effect. The major requirement to be satisfied before the rule
applies is that there must be a written contract. In determining
whether this requirement has been satisfied, no relevant evidence,
whether parol or otherwise, ought to be excluded. Obviously, there
is no parol evidence rule to be applied until the prerequisites for its
application have been satisfied.
What then is the nature of a written contract? It is at least clear
that not every document which relates to or evidences a contract
concluded orally will render it a contract in writing. A writing may
come into existence in a number of ways and for a variety of
reasons. If one of the parties makes a note of the terms so as to
furnish an aid to his recollection, that will not be a written
contract. 74 Neither will a mere receipt, 7 5 an invoice, 76 nor a
74. Dalison v. Stark (1803), 4 Esp. 163; 170 E.R. 677 (N.P.).
75. Allen v. Pink (1838), 4 M. & W. 140; 150 E.R. 1376 (Exch); McMullen v.
Williams (1880), 5 O.A.R. 518 (C.A.).
76. Holding v. Elliott (1860), 5 H. & N. 117 at 122; 157 E.R. 1123 at 1125
(Exch.)
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memorandum of the terms written out by a third party on his own
initiative. 77 In these situations, the contracts remain oral and the
writings can be used, if at all, only for the purpose of proving the
oral contracts.
However, evidentiary documents are not confined to receipts,
invoices, etc. Even documents which look more like contracts may
be evidentiary only. It is well established that a document, although
it appears to have been executed as a contractual instrument, will
not be operative as such unless it was executed with that intention. It
may have been executed for quite a different purpose, e.g. "to
comply with some official requisition that such a document should
be filled up" .78 If it has, then the real contract between the parties
remains that concluded orally. The parol evidence rule has no
application and cannot preclude proof of the oral contract, although
the form of the document may tend to corroborate the party arguing
that it was executed with the necessary intention. Of course, as in
other branches of the law of contract, the "intention" of the parties
is to be determined objectively. Thus, a party will be precluded
from denying that the document is the contract when the other party
reasonably thinks that it is. He will be bound by the terms of the
document although he privately intended it to operate for some other
purpose than that of constituting the real agreement.
There is also a second fundamental point to be borne in mind
when deciding what is a written contract. This is that, unless the
Statute of Frauds applies, there is nothing in law requiring parties to
set down the whole of their contract in writing. They may agree
upon a contract partly in writing and partly oral if they wish. Such a
contract remains an unwritten or oral contract, partly evidenced in
writing, so that the parol evidence rule has no application. Although
this concept of a hybrid partly written and partly oral contract has
been recognised on a number of occasions by the English 9 and
Canadian courts, s ° its existence and significance have too often
been overlooked.
77. R v. Wrangle (1835),2 Ad & E. 514; 111 E.R. 199 (K.B.D.).
78. Rogers v. Hadley (1863), 2 H. & C. 227 at 247; 159 E.R. 94 at 103 (Exch.)
See also Jervis v. Berridge (1873), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 351 and Hawke v. Edwards
(1948), 48 S.R. (N.S.W.) 21 (N.S.W.S.C. In Banco).
79. See, e.g., Eden v. Blake (1845), 13 M. & W. 614 at 618; 153 E.R. 257 at 259
(Exch.); Palmer v. Johnson (1884), 13 Q.B.D. 351 at 357 and QuickmaidRental
Services Ltd. v. Reece, [1970] S.J. 372 (C.A.).
80. E.g. Eaton v. Crook (1910), 12 W.L.R. 658 at 662 (Alb. S.C.-Full Court);
Allis-ChalmersBullock Ltd v. Hutchings (1912) 11 E.L.R. 350 (1913), 13 D.L.R.
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It has been seen that not every document which relates to or
evidences a contract can be regarded as a written contract. The
document must be intended as a contractual instrument. In addition,
there is nothing in law to prevent parties from making their contract
partly in writing and partly oral. These two factors point to the
definition of a written contract. It is a contractualinstrument which
the parties agree or intend is to contain the whole of their contract.
Although this test of intention has only been spasmodically
recognised, 8 ' it is indisputable once it is accepted that the parol
evidence rule is not a kind of common law version of the Statute of
Frauds - it does not say that where there is a writing all the terms
must be in that writing, only that where there is a written contract
you cannot add oral terms.
2. The Indicia ofIntention
As in other areas of the law of contract, the intention of the
parties is to be determined objectively, unless their actual intention
is clear which will not be often. All relevant evidence of the
surrounding circumstances should, therefore, be admissible in order
to determine whether a document constitutes a written contract,
including the evidence relating to the alleged oral term. It is a
question of fact in each case, not simply one of construction of the
instrument itself. To adopt the latter approach is to apply the parol
evidence rule in the course of deciding whether it does apply. It
amounts to attempting to find the intention of the parties from a
document which, ex hypothesi, they may never have intended to be
the final record of their agreement. What the document was
intended to cover cannot be determined until what there was to
82
cover is first examined.
3. The Modern Function of the ParolEvidence Rule
The above conclusions, whilst a marked departure from the rule
as initially conceived and applied, do not mean that it is now
241 (N.B.S.C.);Brocklebank v. Barter (1914), 7 W.W.R. 775 (Alta. S.C.) Wattle
v. Lytton, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 369 (Ont. C.A.).
81. It was mentioned in the following Canadian cases:McLean v. Crown Tailoring
Co. (1913) 29 O.L.R. 455 (App. Div.); Connors v. McGregor, [1924] 2 W.W.R.
294 (Alta. S.C.) Lowe v. MacDonald, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 176 (N.S.S .C.) and Slywka
v. Gamache (1954), 11 W.W.R. 524 (Aita. S.C.).
82. SeeL. G. Thorne & Co. v. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A /Asia) Ltd. (1956), 56
S.R. (N.S.W.) 81 at 93-94 (N.S.W.S.C.In Banco) (per Herron J. (dissenting)).
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completely a spent force. The major function of the rule is to raise a
presumption that a document which looks like a complete contract is
in fact the whole contract. Even if the court is satisfied that oral
representations or promises were made, it does not follow that they
must be treated as part of the contract. The mere proof of the
making of oral promises or representations does not mean that they
were intended to be legally binding. Their exclusion from the
document does indeed indicate that they were not so intended. One
possibility is that they might have been intended to be binding in
honour only.
However, the failure to include an alleged term in the writing
should never be regarded as conclusive of the parties' intention to
exclude it from their contract. The evidence may show, for
example, that it was excluded in order to conceal its existence from
a third party. 83 Unless there was fraud involved, the oral promise
ought to be enforced. This is an extreme case. In other situations,
the approach of the court should be to weigh the factors indicating
that the defendant was accepting contractual responsibility for his
statement against the significance of the omission of the alleged
term from the document and any other adverse factors. This is not
the place to examine the factors which the courts take into account
in determining whether or not a statement was intended to be a term
of the contract; but let us assume, for example, that, prior to signing
an apparently complete written contract, the defendant gave a
positive assurance on an important topic which he was in a position
to know about and which had the immediate effect of inducing the
plaintiff to sign the contract. The failure to include the assurance in
the written contract is adverse to the finding of a term but it is
plainly outweighed by the other factors which strongly indicate that
the defendant was accepting contractual responsibility. The contract
84
ought, therefore, to be regarded as partly written and partly oral.
4. A Question of Weight
The strength of the presumption of completeness will, of course,
This is the only Commonwealth decision which the writer has located containing a
detailed discussion of how the intention of the parties in relation to a particular
writing is to be determined.
83. As inJervis v. Berridge (1873), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 351 and the noted American
case of Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F. 2d, 641 (1943) (Circ C of A - 2nd
Circ.).
84. A good illustration is the Western Australian case of Van Den Esschert v.
Chappell, [1960] W.A.R. 114 (S.C. of W.A.).
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vary from case to case. All evidence ought to be considered but the
necessary quantum and quality of evidence required to satisfy the
burden of proof imposed upon the proponent of the oral agreement,
will vary according to the improbability of his contention. On some
occasions the presumption will appear almost irresistible that a
document was intended to contain the whole contract. However,
this does not mean that the parol evidence ought not to be admitted.
It ought to be admitted but not necessarily given effect. It has been
unfortunate that the parol evidence rule has so often been phrased in
terms of admissibility of parol evidence to vary a written contract,
rather than its effectiveness to vary a written contract.
When one party testifies that the document produced was not
intended to contain all the terms of the contract, he should be
listened to and his testimony weighed. It may be that his evidence is
so flimsy that it is overwhelmed by the initial presumption and the
supporting testimony of the other party and his witnesses. His
evidence may turn out to be the implausible assertion of a party who
has had to suffer the burden of a contract which has not turned out to
be as profitable as hoped. In this situation, the court can reject it. On
the other hand, he may bring along a band of disinterested witnesses
who strongly corroborate his testimony that the oral agreement was
made. The whole question is one of weight, not admissibility.
There are several factors which will affect the strength of the
presumption or the weight to be attached to the parol testimony.
First, the form of the writing. Although no document, however
formal and detailed its provisions, is sufficient by itself to prove that
it was intended to contain the whole of the parties' contract, this
obviously does not mean that all consideration of the writing should
be shut out. It may strongly corroborate the party testifying to its
completeness and accuracy. If the writing is formal and detailed, the
courts ought to be extremely reluctant to allow a new term to be
added to it. On the other hand, in the case of an informal
memorandum, it is less likely that the parties intended it to contain
the whole contract.
Another important factor will be the preparation of the document.
The presumption of completeness will be less easy to rebut if both
parties have played an active role in drawing up the document.
Similarly, if, although one party has independently prepared the
document, it has been submitted to the other party's solicitor for
perusal. However, the position should be otherwise where the
alleged written contract has been communicated unilaterally by one
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party to the other after the conclusion of an oral agreement, e.g. a
letter confirming the bargain sent by the vendor to the purchaser.
Although failure to object to such a letter or confirmation note can
be regarded as assent to it as the complete record of the terms, the
weight attached to it ought not to be as great as where both parties
played a part in its preparation and then signed it. In other words, it
is not so unlikely that there were terms orally agreed upon intended
to be part of the contract. 8 5 Letters of confirmation may often be an
attempt by one party to impose his biased view of the contract on the
other party. In addition, they do not ordinarily look like written
contracts and, provided the evidence is sufficiently respectable, oral
terms ought to be enforced.
Similar considerations apply to standard form contracts. Since the
form has not been drawn up for the express purpose of recording the
particular contract, the parties are less likely to have considered at
the time the form was signed or handed over, whether oral
representations or promises ought to be included in it. Furthermore, the courts have manifested considerable hostility towards
standard form contracts containing wide exemption clauses and, for
this reason also, will be more willing to give effect to oral terms.
The English courts, in particular, have enforced oral terms directly
86
contradicting the printed form.
There are two further factors which are particularly important in
the context of the present article. They are the nature and effect of
the parol testimony and the presence of a merger clause in the
writing.
5. The Nature and Effect of the ParolTestimony
If the particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotiations is
dealt with in the writing, then the presumption will be stronger that
the writing was intended to represent the whole agreement on that
matter. If it is not, the alleged oral term being only additional to
what is contained in the writing, there will perhaps be a stronger
argument that the writing was not intended to embody the whole
85. Cf. Heilbut,Symons & Co. v. Buckleton, [1913] A.C. 30 (H.L.) where a letter
of confirmation was assumed to be a written contract to which an oral term could
not be added. Most of the discussion in the House of Lords centred around whether
the respondent had established a collateral contract.
86. Couchman v. Hill, [1947] K.B. 554; [1947] 1 AIl.E.R. 103 (C.A.),Harling v.
Eddy, [1951] 2 K.B. 739; [1951] 2 AII.E.R. 212 (C.A.). and Mendelssohn v.
NormandLtd, [197011 Q.B. 177; [196912 All.E.R. 1215 (C.A.).
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agreement. However, the mere fact that the parol evidence will vary
the terms of the writing should not be regarded as a decisive factor.
The fundamental question concerns whether the parties can be said
to have intended the writing to contain their entire agreement. If that
intention did not exist, then the parol evidence rule does not apply,
and it therefore does not prevent the other subjects of agreement
from being established, even though they vary the writing. It would
be a futile exercise to attempt to decide whether something which is
conceded as varying the writing should be excluded, by showing
that it does vary the writing.
On a few occasions, however, it has been suggested that,
although the writing may not have been intended to contain the
whole contract, yet the oral terms must not vary or contradict that
part which is in writing - they must be additional to and entirely
consistent with the terms of the document. 8 7 A typical view is as
follows: 8 8
There are cases . . . where the whole of the contract is not in
writing but part of it is. In such cases the document is a record of
part only of the contract. In such case the remaining terms can be
proved by extrinsic evidence . . . But if the added matter which
makes up the remaining terms of the contract is oral then it is
subject to the first rule expressed, viz: the terms sought to be
added must be consistent with those expressed in the instrument.
If the above quotation is correct, the law must be stated as
follows. Parol evidence is ineffective to vary, add to or contradict
the terms of a written contract. There will not be a written contract
to which the rule applies, unless the particular writing was intended
to be a complete record of the contract. Therefore, a contract which
was intended to be partly in writing and partly oral is outside the
operation of the rule. Yet, with respect to the part of the contract that
is in writing, the parol evidence rule, prevents its variation or
contradiction by the oral part. This is to invoke a rule which, ex
hypothesi, does not apply. In effect, it is an attempt to establish a
new parol evidence rule in relation to contracts partly oral and partly
in writing. At one moment it is said that the rule preventing the
87. Bank of Australiav. Palmer, [1897] A.C. 540 at 545 (J.C.); Hoyt's Pty Ltd. v.
Spencer (1919), 27 C.L.R. 133 at 143-144 (H.C. of A.); Connors v. McGregor,
[192432 W.W.R. 294 at 300 (Alta S.C.);McLean v. Crown TailoringCo. (1913),
29 O.L.R. 455 (App. Div.).
88. National Oil Pty. v. Stephenson (1950), 50 S.R. (N.S.W.) 51 at 60
(N.S.W.S.C. In Banco) (per Herron J.).
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variation, contradiction or addition to the terms of a written contract
does not apply unless the writing was intended to embody the whole
contract, and then, in the next breath it is said that the part which is
in writing cannot be varied or contradicted by the oral part by virtue
of the same rule which has been said not to apply!
Of course, if a contract is partly in writing and partly oral, the
oral part must always have some effect upon the application and
legal operation of the written part. There may be no objection to
refusing to allow the oral part to vary or contradict what is written if
a clear line can be drawn between the field covered by the writing
and that covered orally. Where the writing has an easily severable
sphere of operation, the court may be able to ascertain what it is that
the writing was intended to supersede. However, once it is
established that the writing was not intended to contain the whole
contract (assuming, of course, that it does relate to one contractual
transaction), it is difficult to see how the partial writing can be
regarded as having been intended to supersede anything. Furthermore, even if it is occasionally possible to draw a clear line between
the sphere of operation of the writing and the terms agreed upon
orally where they both relate to a single contract, to say that the
partial writing can only be added to, not varied or contradicted, still
involves inventing a new and secondary parol evidence rule. That
rule, as usually phrased, extends not only to variations and
contradictions of, but also to additions to, the writing.
Where the evidence shows that the writing was not intended to
contain the whole contract, that writing is not a written contract
subject to the operation of the parol evidence rule. Contracts partly
oral and partly in writing should be regarded as oral or unwritten
contracts which are to some extent evidenced by writing. It is
therefore suggested that the authorities holding that the oral terms
shall not vary or contradict that part of the contract which is in
writing, but must be additional to and consistent with it, ought not
to be followed unless the court has first found as a fact that the
writing was agreed upon as a definite record of severable part of the
contract. Usually, of course, the finding that there were oral terms
will negative such a conclusion. If the court finds that there were
oral terms varying the writing this will also prove that the writing
was not agreed upon as a complete record of part of the contract.
It is suggested that the correct position is that the nature and effect
of the parol testimony goes only to weight, not admissibility.
Although it is more likely that evidence of an additional and
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consistent oral term will be believed, the mere fact that the evidence
varies or contradicts the written terms does not necessarily prove
that it is untrue. The burden of proof ought to be stricter, but the
surrounding circumstances and the testimony of other witnesses
may combine to prove that the oral agreement was in fact made.
Where one party alleges an oral term which varies or contradicts the
written terms, he will have more difficulty in convincing the court
than where the oral term is additional to the writing. It is less likely
that the parties would have left the writing in its then form if they
made an oral agreement varying or contradicting the obligations set
out therein. Much will, however, depend on the nature of the
writing. For instance, has it been drawn up for the purpose of
recording the particular contract or is it a standard form? If it is the
latter, there will usually be no real opportunity for amending the
writing so that the evidentiary hurdle will be easier to overcome.
It is on this latter basis that some apparently anomalous decisions
of the English courts can be justified. The first is Couchman v.
Hill.8 9 The plaintiff purchased at an auction a heifer belonging to
the defendant. The heifer was described in the sale catalogue as
'unserved', but it was also stated that the sale was subject to the
auctioneer's usual conditions of sale and that all lots must be taken
"subject to all faults or errors of description". The conditions of
sale, exhibited at the auction, also stated that the lots were sold
"with all faults, imperfections and errors of description". Before
bidding, the plaintiff asked both the defendant and the auctioneer
whether they could confirm that the heifer was unserved and they
both said, "Yes". It was later found that the heifer was in calf and it
died as a result.
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages for breach of contract. Scott L. J. pointed out initially that
"in the absence of some special agreement to the contrary, when the
hammer fell the resulting contract was subject to the printed
conditions of sale exhibited at the auction and to the stipulations
contained in the sale catalogue" .90 The plaintiff's evidence that the
defendant and the auctioneer had orally confirmed the heifer to be
'unserved' was accepted by the court and construed as a warranty. It
had been argued that if there was an oral warranty it was rendered
ineffective by the exemption clause in the printed conditions of sale,
but the court held that the warranty overrode the exemption clause.
89. [1947) K.B. 554; [1947)1 All. E.R. 103 (C.A.).
90. Id. at 557.
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Although the court did not refer to the parol evidence rule, the
decision does support the writer's suggestion that an oral term is not
necessarily rendered ineffective if it contradicts that part of the
contract which is in writing. The plaintiff's evidence of the
conversation was accepted by the court and held to be an oral
warranty. The court seems to have regarded the contract as partly in
writing and partly oral. Both parts were read together as constituting
a single binding contract and the written exemption clause, though
not completely overriden in that it would have excluded liability for
other imperfections (subject to the doctrine of fundamental breach),
had to be read subject to the oral warranty.
It is to be noted that the written document in this case was a
standard form laying down in advance the terms which were to
apply to every bidder. If there had been a document drawn up after
the sale which appeared to record the whole contract, the plaintiff
would have faced much graver difficulties, not only in getting his
evidence believed, but also in convincing the court that the oral
promise was intended to be legally binding. However, it must be
remembered that even in the latter situation the fact that the alleged
oral term contradicts an apparently complete written document,
goes only to weight and the likelihood that the oral promise was
intended to be legally binding. In Couchman v. Hill the plaintiff
faced fewer difficulties because, although it might have been
possible for him to have obtained a written endorsement on the sale
catalogue, there was no real contract document into which the
warranty might have been inserted. A document was not handed to
the plaintiff which purported to be a written contract and which gave
him the opportunity to say, "what about your promise that the
heifer is unserved, shouldn't that go in here?"
Couchman v. Hill was approved and followed in Harling v.
Eddy9 ' and Mendelssohn v. Normand, Ltd. 92 In the latter case, the
plaintiff drove his car into the defendant's parking building. He was
about to lock the car when the attendant told him that the rules of the
garage required that the car be left unlocked. The plaintiff explained
that the car contained valuables and gave the keys to the attendant
who agreed to lock it after he had moved it to a different position.
The attendant then gave the plaintiff a ticket on the back of which
were a number of conditions, including one which purported to
91. [1951] 2 K.B. 739; [1951] 2 All. E.R. 212 (C.A.).
92. [1970] 1 Q.B. 177; [196912 All. E.R. 1215 (C.A.).
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exempt the defendant from liability "for any loss or damage
sustained by the vehicle its accessories or contents however
caused." The attendant did not lock the car and as a result the
valuables were stolen. The plaintiff sued for damages and the
defendant pleaded the exemption clause. The Court of Appeal found
for the plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that the attendant's oral
promise at the time of the contract (which was construed as a
promise "to see that the contents were safe"),93 overrode the
written exemption clause. After referring to Couchman v. Hill and
94
Harlingv. Eddy, Lord Denning M. R. held:
The printed condition is rejected because it is repugnant to the
express oral promise or representation.
Phillimore L. J. was of the same opinion, saying: 95
...

if you have an express undertaking, as here, followed by

printed clauses, the latter must fail in so far as they are repugnant
to the express undertaking.
These statements are rather remarkable when viewed in light of
the traditional concept of the parol evidence rule. Both judges are
saying that greater weight ought to be accorded to what is said
orally than what is in writing. Or, in other words, "we cannot allow
what the parties say orally to be overriden by what is put down in
writing!" As a result, the question has, not unfairly, been posed
96
recently:
Are we witnessing a gradual reversal of the parol evidence rule
which would place the emphasis exactly the other way?
However, it is not necessary to go this far. Although the decision
in Mendelssohn can be justified, the above dicta are too extreme.
The same decision could have been reached without ignoring or
infringing the parol evidence rule. What should have been held was
that the contract was partly in writing and partly oral, or rather, an
oral contract which was partly evidenced in writing. Therefore,
there was no parol evidence rule to prevent the oral part varying or
contradicting what was in writing.
This leaves the question - how ought the courts to go about
finding the parties' true agreement when the contract is partly in
93. Id. at 183 (perLord Denning M.R.).
94. Id. at 184.
95. Id. at 186.
96. J. Burrows, Exception Clauses and Fundamental Breach, [1969] N.Z.L.J.
556.
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writing and partly oral, and the latter varies or contradicts the
former? It is suggested that such contracts ought to be subject to the
same principles of interpretation as contracts contained in two or
more documents. It is established that, where two documents jointly
embody the terms of a single contract, they must be construed
together and the various provisions harmonised with each other.
Both instruments are of equal force and validity so that it is the task
of the court to resolve ambiguities and inconsistencies as best it can.
"The provisions of one instrument may, for example, have to be
read as creating an exception to the provisions of the other, or as
imposing a condition upon a provision which in the other is
apparently absolute." ' 9 7 One document may vary or contradict the
other because this situation is outside the scope of the parol
evidence rule. Jessel M. R. held in In re Wedgewood Coal andIron
Co. 9 8 that, where there are two documents constituting one
transaction, they
are to be read together, so that if there is any ambiguity in one it
may be explained by the other; and even if there is any
inconsistency, you must take the two documents together and see
how you can explain the inconsistency.
A similar approach ought to be taken to contracts partly written
and partly oral. Since the parol evidence rule is also not applicable
to such contracts there is no reason why both parts should not be
regarded as of equal force and validity, and inconsistencies
reconciled in accordance with the above principle of interpretation.
Take the sort of situation which arose in Couchman v. Hill. The oral
warranty, could be read as creating an exception to the operation of
the written exemption clause just as the provisions of one document
may occasionally have to be read as creating an exception to the
terms of another, where both constitute one contract. In other words,
it is for the court to determine as best it can from all the evidence
what was the parties' true agreement.
6. The Presenceof A Merger ClauseIn the Writing
The conflicting decisions of the Canadian courts on the effect of
merger clauses were noted at the beginning of this article. The few
other Commonwealth authorities in point are also conflicting. 99 It is
97. Salmond & Williams, The Law of Contracts (2d ed. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1945) at 155.
98. (1877) 7 Ch. D. 75 at 99 (C.A.)
99. Contrast the early case of Horncastle v. The EquitableLife Assurance Soc. of
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suggested that the better view is that the presence of such a clause
should not be conclusive of the question whether the writing was
intended to be the complete record of the parties' agreement - it
should not be effective to exclude all other evidence on this
preliminary issue of fact.
A merger clause is, in effect, a written statement that the parties
have assented to the document as their complete written contract
and, as such, is strong evidence that it was so assented to, but there
seems to be no valid reason why it should be regarded as conclusive
on this question. It would be illogical, if the writer's previous
suggestions as to the true scope of the parol evidence rule are
accepted, to exclude evidence that the writing was not intended to
record the whole of the parties' contract, simply because the writing
states that it was so intended. It has been seen that whether a writing
was intended to completely record the parties' bargain, so as to
constitute a written contract for the purpose of the applicationof the
parol evidence rule, is a question offact. It is not merely a question
of construing the written document itself. To say otherwise is to
apply the parol evidence rule in the course of seeing whether it does
apply, to attempt to find the intention of the parties from a document
which may never have been intended as the final record of their
agreement. In determining this issue of fact, all relevant evidence is
admissible. Whilst the form and contents of the writing may
strongly corroborate the party alleging that it was intended to
contain the whole contract, these factors are not decisive but go only
to weight. Other evidence may combine to rebut the presumption of
completeness.
It follows that the presence of a merger clause in the writing
should not be conclusive on the preliminary inquiry into the
intention of the parties. The fact that a document contains an
express statement that it records all the terms agreed upon does not
prove that the document itself was in fact ever so assented to. It is
certainly a strong indication of the parties' intention and will be
difficult to explain away. However, the essential point which must
be remembered is that, at this preliminary stage, there is no parol
evidence rule which applies to prevent either of the parties from
contradicting that statement. To regard the merger clause as
conclusive is to assume the application of the parol evidence rule.
U.S.A. (1906), 22 T.L.R. 735 (C.A.) with Stuart v. Dundon, [1963] S.A.S.R. 134
(S.C. and S.C. In Banco).
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Basically, a merger clause is a statement of fact and, as such,
may actually be untrue. Other evidence may show that the writing
was not assented to as a complete record of the parties' contract. A
writing has no magical power to cause statements of fact to be true
when they are actually untrue. A written admission is merely
evidential, not conclusive, and in determining the parties' intention
it will be necessary to weigh the other evidence against the merger
clause.
If the position were otherwise, then, even in the case of a
document which was obviously incomplete on its face, it would not
be permissible for a court to add an orally agreed term. If the
evidence is to be admitted in the latter case (as undoubtedly it
should be), it must also be admissible where the document appears
to be complete, although, of course, the evidential burden will be
much more difficult to overcome. The parties' intention is to be
determined from a consideration of all the circumstances and a
merger clause is merely one of those circumstances. It would be
illogical to hold that, because one circumstance points to a certain
conclusion, evidence of other circumstances should not be listened
to.
The above approach gains some support from the decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in InternationalMilling Co. v.
Hachmeister. 0- 0 Although this case does not represent any uniform
approach of the American courts' 0 1 and, furthermore, is only of
persuasive authority, it is mentioned here because it provides a neat
illustration of the injustices which may result from regarding merger
clauses as conclusive. The parties executed a printed form of
contract for the sale and purchase of flour which contained the
following clause:
This Contract constitutes the complete agreement between the
parties hereto; and cannot be changed in any manner except in
writing subscribed by Buyer and Seller or their duly authorised
officers.
The buyer sought to give evidence that they had orally agreed that
the contract was also to include certain written specifications. He
explained that the written document had not been altered because
the seller did not want to change the normal form of contract.
100. 110 A. 2d 186 (1955) (S.C. of Pennsylvania).
101. There have been several American cases holding merger clauses conclusive;
see McCormick, Handbook on the law of Evidence (St. Paul, Minn: West, 1954) at
451; 3 Corbinon Contracts (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1960) at para. 578.
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It was held that this evidence was admissible since, if true, it
showed that the writing was not intended as a complete record of the
contract, despite the express provision stating the contrary. It was
regarded as akin to "fraud" if the seller could insist upon the
application of the parol evidence rule. The court said that the
02
presence of a merger clause'
cannot invest a writing with any greater sanctity than the writing
merits where, as here, it assertedly does not fully express the
essential elements of the parties' undertakings
The weight to be attached to merger clauses will depend upon the
circumstances of each case, particularly the presence or otherwise
of the other factors already mentioned. In the case of a standard
form contract, the presence of a merger clause ought not to render
the presumption of completeness more difficult to rebut than it
otherwise might be. Seldom will the complaining party have read
the clause, let alone understood its effect upon the representations
and promises made by the other party. On the other hand, in the
case of a formal document specially drawn up by the parties'
professional advisers to record the particular transaction and signed
in their presence, the merger clause will make the presumption of
completeness almost irresistible. However, this does not mean that
all extrinsic evidence should be rejected out of hand. It must be
listened to before the court can determine its probative value. It
may, albeit in rare cases, be sufficiently strong, for example, to
satisfy the court that the parties privately entered into an oral
agreement which was intended to operate along with the agreement
expressed in the writing.
7. The CollateralContract-An

UnnecessaryDevice

If the above analysis is accepted, it follows that the collateral
contract, although not a true exception to the parol evidence rule
since it does not purport to add a term to the writing, is no longer a
necessary device to avoid the application of the rule, unless the
Statute of Frauds also applies. When an oral agreement is made
prior to the execution of a written agreement which is intended to
have contractual effect, there is in truth one contract, partly in
writing and partly oral. No longer is it necessary for the courts to
102. 110 A. 2d 186 at 191 (1955). (S.C. of Pennsylvania) See also Air
Conditioning Corporationv. Honaker, 16 N.E. 2d 153 (1938) (App. Ct. of Ill.)
where a merger clause was held ineffective because "untrue".
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strain the facts of individual cases in order to infer an intention to
make two contracts rather than one.
IV. Conclusion
Inconsistency ought not to be a bar to the enforcement of an oral
agreement as a collateral contract where the making of the oral
agreement has been satisfactorily proved. However, the long line of
authorities to the contrary makes it unlikely that the courts will be
willing to re-open the matter. Fortunately, there is a way open to the
courts to avoid the consequences of these decisions, if the
conclusions in Part III are accepted. It is no longer necessary to
perpetuate the device of the collateral contract in order to get around
the parol evidence rule. Where an oral agreement has been
satisfactorily proved, the contract can be regarded as partly in
writing and partly oral. If the oral agreement is inconsistent with the
written terms, then it is for the court, as a matter of interpretation, to
reconcile the inconsistency in accordance with what it considers to
be the true intention of the parties. Inconsistency is not a bar to the
enforcement of the oral part of the contract, but is a matter going
only to weight. It only affects the likelihood that the oral agreement
was ever made.

